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identified in these cases shows clustering with sequences 
of African origin, as observed for our patient (6–8). How-
ever, because only a small number of sequences of DENV-
3 strains from Africa are available (and not all sequences 
refer to the same genomic region), a comparative phylo-
genetic analysis of strains from Africa is limited. A recent 
investigation of febrile patients from Gabon showed not 
only circulation of DENV-3, but simultaneous circulation 
of 3 DENV serotypes (DENV-1, DENV-2, and DENV-3) 
in West Africa (10).
Molecular data for travelers are useful in areas 
where DENV diagnosis and surveillance are not routine-
ly performed. The case-patient reported here highlights 
sustained transmission of DENV-3 genotype III strains 
or closely related strains during recent years. Increas-
ing numbers of reports on local outbreaks and available 
phylogenetic information support ongoing DENV-3 
transmission in West Africa. If one assumes a maximum 
incubation time of 14 days, our case-patient was most 
probably exposed to DENV in Togo or Burkina Faso. 
These 2 countries have not been considered as areas to 
which DENV is endemic. Our findings indicate that fur-
ther systematic evaluation of the risk and disease burden 
of dengue in Africa is urgently needed. Dengue fever 
should be considered in travelers returning from Africa 
with acute febrile illness.
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To the Editor: Group A streptococci (GAS) can cause 
severe invasive diseases, such as necrotizing fasciitis, strep-
tococcal toxic shock syndrome, and sepsis. In 2012, ≈11,000 
cases of invasive GAS (iGAS) disease and 1,100 associated 
deaths occurred in the United States (1,2). The risk for iGAS 
infection is 10 times higher among Native Americans than 
among the general population (3). Other predisposing fac-
tors for iGAS infection include skin wounds and underly-
ing diseases, such as diabetes (1,3,4). Household risk factors 
include exposure to children with pharyngitis and crowding 
(4). Most iGAS infections occur sporadically within the 
community. Postpartum and postsurgical clusters arising 
from a common nosocomial source occur but are rare (5).
During the winter of 2012–13, a 3-fold increase in 
necrotizing fasciitis was observed at an Arizona hospital 
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(hospital X) that predominantly treats Native Americans. 
Tribal leadership initiated a collaborative investigation 
with state and federal officials to characterize the out-
break and implement appropriate control measures.
A confirmed case of iGAS was defined as isolation of 
GAS from normally sterile sites (i.e., blood) or isolation of 
GAS from nonsterile sites (i.e., wound) in the presence of 
necrotizing fasciitis or streptococcal toxic shock syndrome 
among patients who sought care at hospital X during Au-
gust 2012–March 2013. Hospital X serves ≈45,000 persons 
in a rural community. Eleven confirmed iGAS cases were 
identified (Figure), of which 8 (73%) occurred in women 
and 3 (27%) occurred in men. The case-patients had a 
mean age of 63 years (range 32–92 years). All cases were 
community-onset illnesses; none of the case-patients had 
recent exposures to health care settings, and all were of Na-
tive American ancestry. Of the 11 case-patients, 8 required 
critical care treatment and 3 died. Nine (82%) case-patients 
had open wounds or skin breakdown (e.g., skin abrasion, 
burns), and 9 had underlying medical conditions that are 
known risk factors for iGAS (e.g., obesity, diabetes, chron-
ic kidney or heart disease, alcoholism).
Five GAS isolates were available. Two of the isolates 
were emm type 11; antimicrobial drug–susceptibility pro-
files for the 2 were identical (i.e., tetracycline resistant). 
The 2 patients reported no close contact with each other, 
but they had the same home health aide. The other 3 iso-
lates had different emm types (1, 12, and 82) and were anti-
microbial drug pansensitive.
We interviewed 58 household contacts of the case-
patients (35 adults, 23 children) regarding symptoms and 
risks for secondary GAS infection. Among these contacts, 
2 adults reported a sore throat and 6 children reported 
fever (without sore throat), but no confirmed secondary 
GAS infections were identified. Because of the known in-
creased risk for iGAS among Native Americans and the 
level of crowding (average of 2–3 persons/bedroom) and 
the high proportion of adult household contacts with pre-
disposing underlying conditions (29%) in this population, 
azithromycin prophylaxis was offered to household con-
tacts who spent >24 hours with a case-patient during the 7 
days preceding the onset of illness.
With the exception of the 2 case-patients with a com-
mon health aide, we found no common epidemiologic 
links or common behaviors among patients that suggested 
a single-source outbreak. This was further supported by 
the finding of multiple emm types among the isolates. 
These are not unusual findings in community outbreaks of 
iGAS; clusters of iGAS cases have often been observed 
without a common source (6–8). Localized and transient 
increases in sporadic GAS infections may occur because 
of an influx of a new emm type into a population with low 
levels of community immunity to that specific emm type; 
an increase in the detection and reporting of iGAS without 
a true increase in infection; or an increase in conditions 
that predispose persons to iGAS, such as GAS pharyngi-
tis among children or concurrent influenza or other virus 
outbreaks in the community.
Past studies have shown that the risk of secondary 
iGAS infection among household contacts of patients 
with iGAS disease is higher than that among the general 
population but still low (5). Although Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention guidelines do not recommend 
routine chemoprophylaxis for household contacts of pa-
tients with iGAS infection, the guidelines state that pro-
viders may choose to offer antimicrobial drug prophylaxis 
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Figure. Week of symptom onset 
and principal clinical syndrome of 
patients with confirmed invasive 
group A streptococcus infections at 
hospital X, Arizona, August 2012–
March 2013. STSS, streptococcal 
toxic shock syndrome.
to those household contacts at increased risk for iGAS 
infection (5). Because Native Americans have increased 
rates of iGAS disease, compared with those of the gen-
eral population, and because households in this investiga-
tion were crowded and many contacts had predisposing 
underlying conditions, we recommended that household 
contacts receive prophylaxis if given within 30 days of 
the index case-patient’s illness (5). No additional cases 
were reported at least 3 months after the investigation 
and intervention.
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To the Editor: Local area network (LAN) gaming cen-
ters (variant of cyber cafes) have proliferated over the past 2 
decades. Patrons sometimes spend considerable time play-
ing multiplayer computer games at these centers. We report 
a 2012 outbreak of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR 
TB) in Singapore, in which transmission occurred among 
5 immunocompetent 19- to 28-year-old men within 2 LAN 
gaming centers. This report highlights LAN gaming centers 
as potential hotspots for TB transmission and notes chal-
lenges faced when conducting contact-tracing investigations 
in such settings.
The outbreak timeline is shown in the online Tech-
nical Appendix Figure (http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/21/1/14-1159-Techapp1.pdf). Patients A–D had 
frequented LAN center 1, but 3 months before patient A 
received a TB diagnosis, the center closed, and they contin-
ued their gaming activities at LAN center 2. Patient E had 
only patronized LAN center 2. In February 2012, the ini-
tial case-patient, patient A, sought medical care for a cough 
of 4 months’ duration. Chest radiographs showed bilateral 
cavitary lesions, a sputum smear was positive for acid-fast 
bacilli, and a sputum culture grew M. tuberculosis with 
phenotypic resistance to rifampin, isoniazid, streptomycin, 
and ethionamide. Contact tracing for patient A was delayed 
because he defaulted on directly observed therapy after 5 
days and eluded contact for 6 weeks.
Before his diagnosis, patient A had spent several hours 
daily at LAN center 1, where he participated in gaming and 
worked part time. Thirty contacts from center 1 were identi-
fied, but most failed to show up for screening until Ministry 
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